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Epistemic Authority, Rationality
and the Fallacy of Educational
Democracy
by John H. Chambers
Tasmanian College of Advanced Education, Launceston

In any rational authority system, authority must be closely connected to
point, purpose and function. The situation of authority in colleges and univer.sities (T.E.l.s*) provides a special case of such point, purpose and function.
The present paper tries to show the quite special features of the epistemic
authority of academics that provide rational justification for their
in many positions of social authority in their institutions. To do this, (1)
aspects of the point, purpose and function of such epistemic
,tn'"lrIf·'I>." will be demonstrated, (2) the logical necessity of academic
nes for rational endeavour will be pointed out, and (3) the mistakes inin the common notion of educational democracy will be exposed.

dKI'O~l\fleaCle)

Point, Purpose and Function of Epistemic Authority

Firstly, some general societal aspects of epistemic authority should be in-

It is clear that no person can hope to master more than a minute part of the
10\'~leclae

that exists. In order that it is all mastered, there need to be
this is similar to saying that there need to be epistemic
Concomitantly, it can be argued that the vast body of knowledge
mastered by people who become epistemic authorities, if the
complex, industrial, liberal Western democracies are to continue to

1ovvle(jge!'s~)eciali~sts:

what makes the existence of knowledge or epistemic
a sort of natural necessity, is that mastery of any area of
:lWleaCle is itself a slow and laborious business, that must be gone through
person is in a position to understand, let alone, to criticise, judge,
develop the area, in an informed rather than a superficial way. (It is
case that some people just seem to be 'drawn' to particular
and to do well at them, while there are areas of knowledge that
intelligent part of the population is just incapable of understanding.)
, as de George says,
Reliance on authority is a way in which knowledge can be transmitted
and shared, so that more men may know and use this knowledge than
would otherwise be the case. This, in brief, is the basis for the argument
that epistemic authority is in general legitimate. The argument is a
'" tertiary educational institution
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pragmatic one, and it claims that in some cases it is reasonable and rational to accept the word of someone else that p is the case (de George,

1976, p.83).
And further,
Epistemic authority is thus in principle substitutional in nature. Its purpose is to substitute the knowledge of one person in a certain field for the
lack of knowledge of another (de George, 1976, p.82).
So whereras social authority uses other persons to get things done,
knowledge authority is used by other persons both to gain knowledge and to
get things done.
Two qualifications should now be made. Certainly it would seem that the
sensible thing to do for anyone who is not an authority on a given subject, is
.. to defer to the beliefs of those who are, for what better grounds can
one who is not knowledgeable in a given field have for a belief in that area
than that it is the belief of one who is knowledgeable in such matters,
especially of one whose business is to know about such things?*
(Adams, 1976, pA)
What is more, the person knows, ". ,. that the authority, in assessing the
reasons that are available to him, has been led to this position" (Adams, 1976,
p.5). But while all this is true, it (a) must be carefully noted that the knowledge
or epistemic authority is indeed restricted to the area of knowledge, except for
some possible transfer to adjacent disciplines and except for"_ •. the transfer of
scholarly habits of care, toughmindedness, etc/' (de George, 1976, p.85).
And (b) someone is to be considered an authority in various degrees: the
history teacher is an authority in relation to his pupils: depending on his
special period, he mayor may not be an authority in relation to the T.E.lleeturer.
Secondly, some specific attributes of the individual epistemological authority should be noted.
Academics have themselves passed through T.E.l.s specifically established
to train and educate. They have acquired specialist knowledge and u
ding, and in various degrees some expertise in passing on and developing this
knowledge and understanding in others. And the diplomas and degrees they
have acquired are society's stamps of approval to show that this is indeed
case. This is far from suggesting that T.E.I academics are all-knowing, or
some very narrow and bigoted people do not become academics. Neither is
to suggest that for those academics who have teaching qualifications
qualifications are fool-proof and mistakes never made in such certification.
is merely to say that most academics have mastered a significant
ding in a specialist area.
As time passes, academics generally increase this knowledge and PVI'lP,-ti"i'
developing, modifying and refining it through interaction with others
through a developing sensitivity to the nuances of the discipline.
*The author is not talking about matters of mere belief, (such as religion?)
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Academics also .demonstrate their knowledge and competence: they
understanding and a degree of mastery in their students; they contmue to turn out graduates who can take their place in the complex activities
?f :~e real ,":,orld ..The ~nowl~dge authority of academics is really being
Justified ?o~tlnually In an I~ductl~e manner. It is justified in and depends upon
t~e co~tlnulng proper dealing with actual cases. Like all inductive generalisations, It :akes only a :ew cases of being wrong for their authority to begin to
be questioned. (Is this a psychological rather than a logical issue? Is it a fact
about how people ac~ually behave in relation to authorities, rather than about
how they should logically behave?)
~evelop

Tha: .ac~demics. can in general demonstrate that they are epistemic
authorities IS a reminder of the implicit point that there is no ineradicable difference between what an academic knows and what a student knows with
the e~ception of course of students who just are intellectually incapable of
grasping the n:atter. !he academic's claims are authoritative because they
ha~e t~e bac~l~g ~f I~dependently establishable knowledge, a backing acqUired In public Instltuyons, a b~ckin~ that if someone wishes, can be publicly
a backing that given time and application most students can if
desire to acquire for themselves. There is thus nothing metaphysical
. th~ fact that academics are knowledge authorities who make
~uthorltatlve ~taten:ents. It·is merely that they have passed through a period
and place of ~nductlo~, and such induction is in principle equally possible for
other. ratlon~1 being. Indeed, students in T.E.l.s are at various stages in
very induction .. For the academic in his justified role is trying to make
~edundant, In.the sense of trying to get his students no longer to need
, trymg to make hiS students into his epistemic peers. The academic life innot just .the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, but also the
.disiint,erested passing-on of knowledge.
There is of course a crucial corollary. An academic is to be listened to
he is an authority. But his authoritative utterance, like all such
luv,rn,:lJIUI:! authority is only provisional. For we know very well that the inI history of mankind is a succession of the establishment then later
of statements by an authority. The chemist, Arrhenius was awardthe Nobel Prize for his electrolYtic theory of dissociation; it was later given
Debye for showing the inadequacies in Arrhenius's theory (Barbour, 1971,
In cosmol?gy, Ptolemaic worldviews were succeeded by Copernician,
Newtonlan and then Einsteinian, with questions nowadays even beasked about the last.

!pt:l'lidll:;t:l

showed the physicians of nineteenth century Vienna that it was
who spread puerperal fever in childbed. Ben Jonson has given place to
Dr. Johnson, Bradley, Knights or Knight, and Lewis in authoritative
of Shakespeare. We know that today's authoritative utterance
tomorrow. But equally, we know very well that we ought proto accept such statements as the best at present available. The fact
one au:~ority replaces another as time goes by is no argument for the
relatiVity of knowledge or truth. Rather, it is evidence for the opposite:
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the later authoritative statement is really a better explanation, a nearer approx-

in the ~itu.ation. These have to do with the necessary rationality of epistemic
authority Itself, embodied in epistemic authorities.

imation to the truth.
Students should have to do what academics tell them to do in connexion
with the progagation of knowledge and understanding, because at least
relatively speaking academics in T. E.I.s are provisional epistemic authorities. It
is perfectly proper for academics to make pronouncements, give opinions,
develop insights, demand answers, provide examples, promulgate orders and
expect particular sorts of behaviour from their students in academic situations. But at the same time it is essential as I have said elsewhere (1976, p.6)
that they do these things in a 'teacherly' way: authoritatively, not
'authoritarianly' . Academics must develop epistemic authority, but equally
they must develop a general and appropriate scepticism. This requires a nice
balance between authoritative statement and qualification, and is probably
the chief difference between being authoritative and being authoritarian. In
being authoritative and' teacherly' , academics will try to develop in students
a proper propensity to question, by showing that the evolution of human
knowledge has been a gradual refinement, differentiation and development,
but also the realisation that in epistemic matters one person's opinion is not
just as good as another's.
The upshot of the last few pages is that, as Peters argues,
.•. knowledge can only be handed on and developed if institutions are
devised for this purpose. If such institutions are to be organised on rational grounds, this means that those who are authorities on various matters are given the opportunity to instruct others and to take part in the administation of the affairs of their institutions. Those who are authorities
must be put in positions of authority at a level which is consistent with
the principle of public accountability (1966, p.251).
Peters is arguing that in a rational system, knowledge authorities because.
they are knowledge authorities should be given the right to social authority.
So for Peters, and the present writer agrees, the situation of the Kno"""leCIQe
authority in the educational institution is but a special case of the more
situation in a society that is based on rational authority. Here the crucial
the rational authority situation comes through the interesting idea
because what the epistemic authority says is right (correct, advisable),
given the right (entitlement) to give orders, tell people what to do, in
to that knowledge authority he possesses. This seems to me to have the
portant corollary that academics should work hard at showing that
epistemic authority is· actully a resource for the community in general and
students in particular.
The Logically-Necessary Connexion Between Rationality and Al:aQ'errl!C
Disciplines
It has so far been argued that it is rational to give social authority in T.
to academics because in so doing, the point, purpose and function of T.
are met. But other aspects of rationality can also be shown to feature
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Thought and b~haviour, in order to be rational in even the most elementary
sense must ta~e Into ac~ount what has happened and what will happen, as
well as what. IS ~appenln.g. Only the possession of language makes these
features pOSSible In anything more than a superficial way.
mor~ complex the language that takes in these aspects, the more radoes .'t become possible for the thought and behaviour to be. And it is
.preclsely this. more complex language that makes up the entities that we refer
to as theoretical knowledge or knowledge of disciplines.

. The

tlon~1

For bei~g rational involves not merely having concern for the point purpose
function of an orga~isation or institution. It also involves, in' meeting
p.urpose an.d functlo~ such features as seeking the truth, trying to get
right, ar~~lng as loglcal~y as possible, providing good reasons for any
,,,,,,::;\,Lua, pO~I.tlon held (which of course includes bringing to bear apempIrical data) discriminating only when there are relevant difand so ~n. The reason for mentioning this aspect of rationality here,
show how It strengthen~ the. case of the epistemic authority; for the
of .~nowledge of th~ eplstemlc authority would seem to put him in an
position to complYI/I(~th these strictures of rationality in his own area of
. Clearly, rati?n~lity has a great deal to do with the quality of
. The better the thl.nkl~g, the more rational the argument, the more rathe person, and derivatively the more rational the organisation.
But there is a f~rther ~n?erlying, epistemologically-fundamental aspect of
that reqUlr~s pOinting out. Without this aspect, the very existence of
worse, r~tlon~1 ~r more or less rational thinking would itself be imBennett IS pOinting to this fundamental feature when he writes,
. .. onl'( linguistic behaviour can be approriate or inappropriate to that
which. IS not. both particular and present. . (whereas!. . non-linguistic
beha~lIou.r. . IS necessarily related to states of affairs only in so far as it
consl~ts In an attempt to do something about that state of affairs which
constitutes the pre~en~ and particular environment of the behaver. . one
conseq~ence of this IS that only in language is it possible to register
theoretical knowledge (1964, p.87,88).
is not merel,( that without the tool of language, men could never become
at all.. It. IS. also the case that it is only because of the sophisticated
of dlsclpl.lnes that human beings can master concepts such as point
an.d .functlon and grasp what these are in complex organisational set~
and It IS o.nly because there is the sophisticated language of disciplines
. beings c.an. engag.e in the more complex aspects of getting
right, or thinking logically. The ~ame point can be put tangentially
that for a person to be more rational he requires actual theoretical
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,
. ' nal thinking and action cannot be carried
and disciplined knowledge, for ratio
..
.
rder to be rational require that
.,
R ( nal thought and action In 0
t
h selves with concepts and statemen.s
on simpliCiter. a 10 •
the thought and action concern t I em Ids This means further, that cetens
about the concrete and. conceptua wO~ed' e a erson has, the more rational
paribus, the more expen~nce and know b g It aiso means that specialist and
will his thought and actl?n be able tO e~tionality in dealing with specialist
d
disciplined knowledge Will hel~;o;a~ ~i~es of academic institutions s~?h as
areas such as are cov~red by t
p st d by the epistemic authorities of
T.E.l.s, disciplines which have been ma ere
such institutions.
.
between rationality in T.E.l.s and
The logically neces.sary contex~on
son for giving epistemic authorities
disciplined knowledge IS ~hu~ a urt er rea
the right to social authority In T.E.l.s
The Fallacy of Educational DemocracY*
.
.
f h' article comes through challenging a
Further support for the. theSIS 0 t IS, te T E I social authority, For it is
widespread misconception of approprTla El' ~;e one part of the larger
sted that because . ' ,s
"
'
,
sometimes sug~e,
h should be run' democratically , I.e. In
democracy outSide their walls t ey , g of the larger democracy. Just
manner si~ilar son:ehdow ~o t ~ ~~~~~er it is even a realistic option are
this view Involves In etal, ~~t such critics appear to have in mind is at
generall.y cI~ar. However, ~e vote situations, majority decisions and
something like one ma~h?'
seems to me to be a very atrophied
of staff and students.
IS VI~W t the outside democracy is a very
that outside democ:ac~, For faCt I and things such as the protection

h

17

~~~~~~no~~ii~~~~:I~i~:S~~~e~o~e ~~~cial, A democracy is not a
of the majority. As Andreskl says,

The ultimate value of democracy is as a bulwark against tyranny and as
means of achieving individual freedom (1976, p.58).

0:

, "
f
h
sent case much of the actual
What is more and
slgnl:lcance ~rtt.e ~~nsultation' with and in the
y
tivity of a dem,ocratlc soclet co~s~so~i~S in authority, rather than in
of representations to people an
,
having representatives on such bodies,
,
h
umentation it may be suggested that
To give more detail tO tbe, arg ffered by advocates of democracy in T.E.I
democratic model usual Iy elng 0
is suspect in two interrelated ways,
t 'd
l the T E I is a multi-purpose
Firstly, the general democracy o~ St e lated'T'E' I purposes of pursuing
'h h I' 't d two In erre
. .,
not one Wit t e Iml e,
"
f the democratic state
,
k wledge The multi purposes 0
"
n
o
passlng- . no b
11' d "the state's political and social concerns .
I' t f things such as general concern for
may succl,nctly e ca e
concerns Involve an en dl ess IS 0
~This section owes much to the writing of R.S. Peters.

54

munity health and welfare, pensions for the old, road safety campaigns,
foreign policy, crime prevention, providing money for defence, protecting the
political interests of minorities, ensuring there are sufficient T. E.l.s, and so
on. With respect to many of these issues, the ideas of one person are as good
as those of another, hence the electoral policies of one man one vote that
~"~".~~ on representatives to do the final deciding.
But the purpose of a T.E.1. is not multiple in this way. T.E.l.s pursue
knowledge and provide education and training for students in particular
specialist areas. And as has just been argued, it is manifest that there are
.th,nri1·i"" in these areas. So in order for academics to carry out these purproperly performing their functions, what is required is not some
nl"hi~iti~ democracy, but the implementation of the two principles that Peters
autonomy of academics (academic freedom), and provisional
of academics (1973, pp. 44-45).
knowledge is to be expanded and truth to be pursued, and if students are to
inducted into this knowledge, then academics must be allowed freedom to
on such endeavours. They must not be restricted by the predilections
of politicians, businessmen, trade union leaders, authoritarian
istrators, short-sighted student activists, or anyone else who may
or find inconvenient to their cause, the things that pursuit of truth and
ge reveal. To give in. to any of these is to provide the thin edge of the
for the others. PolitYcal interference is probably the most all-encomand invidious. Examples are legion in most of the world outside the
. Two representative examples are the disastrous effect on academic life
University of Ghana by President Nkrumah, and the complete destrucof such academic life by Amin in Uganda. But examples are common of
influence by some of the other groups just mentioned, for example
'MIt1,,~,nr<'<>r1 student interference during the 1960s in academic life not only
but in other parts of the world. To take but one instance. At the
of Chile in Santiago, the Research Assistant in the Medical School
his laboratory left uncleaned for six months because he opposed various
to power by students and ancillary staff. This had the most adverse efon the breeding programme in genetics, where twenty years of work
(personal communication to the present writer).
ng from the principle of the provisional authority of academics
for earlier) is the claim that it is usually only academics who know
just what is needed in a course that is to help students to master
and just what areas at the edges of the field are likely to
for further research and exploration. This means that academics
have the controlling say in the content of courses, in the appointments
academics in the field, and in the general control of accreditation of
in that field (j .e. examining). Bell makes a significant observation, in
calls the paradox of authoritarian (he means' authoritative' ) justificahe says,
difficulty is that the very inequality for which the exercise of authority
remedy may preclude those at whose benefit it is aimed from judging
it is being exercised competently or not. I cannot help but feel
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that this difficulty has been nicely illustrated in recent months (Bell was
talking of 1970) by some campus debated between academics and
under-graduates about the content of courses and curricula. Academics,
called upon to justify their dealings with the undergraduate mind, face
the difficuhy that it is an undergraduate mind which has to comprehend
this justification. Hence the very justification itself risks appearing in
undergraduate quarters as yet a further exercise of unjustified and arbitrary authority (1971, p.202).
Of course this does not mean that there are not times when academics need
to be brought back to earth from their ivory towers by way of financial constraints and community pressures, or that there are not times when coteries of
academics who decide to appoint only persons who hold political views similar
to their own should be constrained by the outside democracy from using the
T.E.1. as a place for indoctrination. It merely emphasises the significance of
the principle of the provisional authority of academics and thus their crucial
position in the authority hierarchy of T.E.l.s.
Secondly, the above model of T. E.I. democracy is suspect in so far as, even
in the wider democracy outside the walls of the T. E.I., one man one vote is
ed only in specific cases. It is used to elect representatives to do the deciding
in a parliament and a cabinet; it is thus used where issues are mUltiple general
ones where the average person's opinion is as good as any other.
although there are referenda on various issues, these are infrequent, and
of general non-specialist concern to all citizens. Again, while there are
course one man one vote situations in all sorts of organisations inside
general democracy such situations occur only when one person's opinion
as good as another, e.g. to decide on cricket club policy, or to elect the
man of the women's institute. What is more, the general democracy also
deed appoints specialists in a wide range of areas, and leaves them alone
get on with their work. In fact, for the multiple purposes of a democracy to
carried on, such specialists must most of the time be left to get on with
job. And getting on with the job entails authoritative activity and decision,
elections. To take an extreme case that makes the point properly: prisons
fulfil their point, purpose and function in the general democracy by being
autocratically. Hospitals are largely in the control of medical personnel,
patients. And the same sorts of consideration apply from fire brigades
kindergartens. In short, appropriate institutions in the larger democracy,
order to fulfil their function and to run rationally do not have to be
'democratically' if by 'democratically' is meant one man one vote
and plebicites of the consumers or clients. Brubacher argues similarly
. ,. neither college nor university is a political community. Its b
not government but the discovery, publication and teaching of
learning. Its governance is based not on numbers or the rule of
jority, but on knowledge. The fact that a society is politically nrr,,,nll,,,,,n
a democracy does not entail that all its other institutions-- its
industrial corporations, military and naval forces-- must be so
(1977, p.36).

Indeed, rational authority i
d
types, e.g. in business in then b~reaeu~~ac~acy falls under num.erous different
Y
in associations, and all of these varieties

a~: t~:n~~i~~~~~~ti~~i!~~~~e~nions,

But of course in T Eis th
I
.
tionally are not the pr~r~~ativ~~:~~:;~ a.reas(~f ~eCISi?n. and control that raare such areas, that is at the base of m ~IC~. h er aps I~ IS the fact that there
T.E.l.s.) Whether Indonesian ought to ~~keop ~ e ~onfuslon about authority in
money ought to be spent on nucle
r ce ence over French; whether
whether there should be co-operatio~rb~~:~ tha~ ~~ so!ar energy projects;
new library building should be constructed. :hneetlgh oun~g T..E.l.s; whether
er a university ought to be
t
'
B:

..

:re

as. muc~ the conce~n ~nd right of the in~erested layma~:~~~
umni, or.t e commUnity In general, as they are of the acad .
~~ ~OIn~UI, fun~tlon~l, purposeful and therefore rational to have ~~~~
e~p e toget er with academics on senates of universities and over
conuClls of CAEs, on state higher education coordinating bodies, ;nd s~
.

..

Ed~ ~~~~i~; i~o;hceu~~~ :t· ~~~ ~~~~~w;etnh~h~~~ i:h:~:aad:daaconc~r-

ISS~~!
.

But it shoul? be carefully noted that the issues described in the
.
ph are Indeed non-.specialist social-moral ones on wh·lch th preVIOUS
auth on· r · · '
, e r e are no
les, a~d:~t~at epistemic authorities must be paramount on
tt
ma ers or rationality suffers.
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